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CASE NOTE
TORT LAW—Duty a Little Unthought Of:
The Wyoming Supreme Court’s Confused Duty Analysis in
Glenn v. Union Paciﬁc R.R. Co., 176 P.3d 640 (Wyo. 2008)
+ERRY ,UCK 4ORRY

INTRODUCTION
On June 30, 2006, Steve Glenn arrived for work at the Black Butte mine.1
That day he did not proceed to his usual work assignment as a blaster, instead
he reported to the coal-loading area.2 Union Paciﬁc coal cars arrived in the coalloading area, where Black Butte’s workers proceeded to open the coal car doors
and securely lock them before they loaded coal.3 A more experienced worker
instructed Glenn on how to open the coal car doors with a pry bar, swinging them
closed to engage the locking mechanism.4 For some time, Glenn walked along the
balloon track, opening and closing the coal car doors.5 As he went about his job,
he noticed some cars still contained coking coal.6 At the ﬁfteenth coal car, Glenn’s
pry bar slipped out of the door notch, and released an avalanche of coking coal
pellets.7 The coking coal scattered along the balloon track, causing Glenn to fall
and severely break his leg.8 An ambulance rushed him to the hospital, but despite
medical intervention, Glenn could not return to work.9

* Candidate for J.D., University of Wyoming, 2010. I would like to thank my husband, Bob,
my family, and friends for their encouragement and patience regarding this project. Particularly, I
would like to thank my advisor, Professor Eric Johnson, for his thoughtful support and insightful
critiques.
1

Glenn v. Union Paciﬁc R.R. Co., 176 P.3d 640, 641 (Wyo. 2008).

2

)D

3

)D at 642 n.2.

4

)D at 642.

5

Brief of Appellant at 12, Glenn v. Union Paciﬁc R.R. Co., No. 07-16 (Wyo. May 25,
2007). A balloon track consists of a long loop of rail, and acts as part of Union Paciﬁc’s right-of-way
passage through the mine. )D
6

'LENN, 176 P.3d at 642. To produce coking coal, mines process coal into round pellets,
similar to briquettes. )D Coking coal presents a potential for harm because it rolls around under a
person’s feet. See id. at 643.
7

)D at 642.

8

Brief of Appellant, supra note 5, at 12. After Glenn’s accident, the mine’s safety manager
noted that most of the cars contained coking coal, which settled on the lip of the doors of the car,
preventing them from closing and/or locking securely. )D at 13. Workers load coal cars from above
and unload them by releasing the dump doors below. )D at 8. Thus, the load should fall straight
down, completely emptying the car. )D at 8.
9

)D at 32.
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The Black Butte mine regularly delivered its coal to customers via a train of
coal cars provided by Union Paciﬁc.10 Frequently, coal cars returning to Black
Butte from the Union Paciﬁc hub contained “carry-back” product (i.e., residue
from the shipment of coal).11 Though Union Paciﬁc’s contracts with its customers
stipulate that they must clear out the cars of any carry-back product or face ﬁnes,
it rarely enforces these provisions.12 Additionally, mine workers anticipate the coal
cars contain carry-back product; however, this usually consists of unprocessed
coal and not coking coal.13 On the day of Glenn’s injury, the train arrived with 40
unlocked or open doors out of 102, many containing coking coal.14
Glenn ﬁled suit against Union Paciﬁc claiming its negligence caused his
injury.15 The District Court for Sweetwater County granted Union Paciﬁc’s
motion for summary judgment.16 Speciﬁcally, the court found Union Paciﬁc
only owed a duty to provide coal cars free of defects.17 This duty, in the district
court’s opinion, did not run to Glenn’s situation.18 Glenn timely appealed to the
Wyoming Supreme Court.19 The Wyoming Supreme Court disagreed with the
district court.20 Speciﬁcally, one issue proved dispositive: duty.21 It found Union
Paciﬁc owed Glenn a duty to provide coal cars reasonably safe for their intended
use.22 Subsequently, the Wyoming Supreme Court reversed the district court’s
ﬁndings and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.23
The 'LENN decision proves confusing for practitioners because it remains
unclear whether it supports its ﬁnding of duty through (1) premises liability,

10
)D at 5. Coal cars pick up the coal loaded by the mine workers and deliver it to customers.
)D The customer then unloads the car of its coal cargo, and its employees must close the car’s doors.
)D In fact, the contracts between Union Paciﬁc and its customers who receive the coal shipments
explicitly state the customers must close the doors or pay a ﬁne. )D Although this ﬁne can be in
excess of $100 per car, Union Paciﬁc refused to enforce this particular provision of its contracts for
fear of losing customers. )D Union Paciﬁc forbids its employees who operate the train from closing
the doors themselves. )D
11

See id. at 19.

12

)D at 9.

13

Brief of Appellant, supra note 5, at 13.

14

'LENN, 176 P.3d at 642.

15

)D.

16

)D

17

Brief of Appellant, supra note 5, at 16.

18

)D

19

'LENN, 176 P.3d at 641.

20

)D

21

See id. at 642–43.

22

)D at 643.

23

)D. at 645.
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(2) speciﬁc duty elsewhere, or (3) generalized duty.24 Though the court reached
a unanimous decision, nothing in the opinion explains how and why the
Wyoming Supreme Court recognized this duty.25 Additionally, the appellant’s
brief analyzed the facts using the eight-factor test ﬁrst adopted by Wyoming in
'ATES V 2ICHARDSON.26 The Wyoming Supreme Court adopted the 'ATES factor
test as a tool for analyzing whether a new duty exists.27 However, the 'LENN court
ignores this useful tool and issues what amounts to an ad hoc decision.28 As such,
the 'LENN opinion offers no insight into how lower courts and practitioners could
apply this new duty in negligence actions regarding railroads and their customers’
employees.29
This case note evaluates the Wyoming Supreme Court’s declaration of duty
in 'LENN V 5NION 0ACIlC 2Y #O.30 First, this case note examines the adoption
of generalized duty by the Restatement (Third) of Torts and the resultant
backlash by those demanding duty remain an element of negligence claims.31
Next, it examines Wyoming’s 'ATES factor test, as a method of evaluating duty
and resolving the confusion inherent in the discussion of duty.32 Third, this note
walks through the principal case and the court’s discussion of duty.33 Finally, it
analyzes the 'LENN court’s confusion regarding duty and the role duty now plays as
an element of negligence.34 Additionally, as this note explains, application of the
'ATES eight-factor test would provide guidance for lower courts and practitioners
likely to deal with similar situations in the future.35

24

'LENN, 176 P.3d at 643–44.

25

)D

26

Brief of Appellant, supra note 5, at 30–33 (citing Borns ex rel. Gannon v. Voss, 70 P.3d 262,
273); Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d 193, 196 (Wyo. 1986).
27

'ATES, 719 P.2d at 196.

28

3EE 'LENN, 176 P.3d at 643–44.

29

See id. at 641–45.

30

See infra notes 112–72 and accompanying text (analyzing the 'LENN court’s duty discussion).

31

See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, 4HE 2ESTATEMENT 4HIRD AND THE 0LACE
OF $UTY IN .EGLIGENCE ,AW, 54 VAND. L. REV. 657, 658–61 (2001); see infra notes 56–83 and
accompanying text (discussing support and criticism regarding the Restatement (Third) of Torts).
32
3EE 'ATES, 719 P.2d at 196; see infra notes 84–95 and accompanying text (discussing the
'ATES factor test).
33

See infra notes 96–111 and accompanying text (analyzing the 'LENN court’s use of
generalized and specialized duty).
34

See infra notes 112–72 and accompanying text (discussing the danger of the Wyoming
Supreme Court’s confusion regarding duty, the general prevalence of confusion regarding duty, and
why such puzzlement harms the practitioners and the courts).
35

See infra notes 158–72 and accompanying text (discussing how the 'ATES factor test helps
resolve confusion regarding duty).
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BACKGROUND
7HY $OES THE 1UESTION OF $UTY -ATTER
Duty remains a difﬁcult concept for practitioners, judges and courts alike.36
First year law students learn duty is the ﬁrst element of a negligence claim.37
However, in actual practice, this certain knowledge gives way to confusion.38
Often, practitioners and courts think of duty as a conundrum, rather than a
vital element.39 Searching through negligence decisions, one realizes that courts
frequently mean different things when they invoke duty.40 Additionally, courts do
not always clearly articulate the principles and rules concerning duty.41 In short,
courts sometimes make mistakes because of their own confusion regarding duty.42
To make matters more complicated, much criticism surrounds the concept
of duty.43 The Restatement (Third) of Torts eliminates duty as an element for
negligence claims.44 Instead, it establishes a generalized duty requiring everyone
to exercise reasonable care.45 However, a backlash arose, insisting duty remain an
integral part of a negligence claim.46 This conﬂict regarding the role of duty creates

36
See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 31, at 657–95 (discussing confusion among attorneys
and judges regarding the interpretation of duty as an element of a negligence claim evidenced by
many confusing and contradictory opinions).
37

WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 31, at 180 (2d ed. 1941).

See generally Robert L. Rabin, 4HE $UTY #ONCEPT IN .EGLIGENCE ,AW ! #OMMENT, 54 VAND.
L. REV. 787, 790 (2001).
38

39

See generally Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 31, at 697.

40

)D

41

See id.

42

See id.; see also Ky. Fried Chicken of Cal. v. Superior Court, 927 P.2d 1260, 1266–69 (Cal.

1997).
43
Aaron D. Twerski, 4HE #LEAVER THE 6IOLIN AND THE 3CALPEL $UTY AND THE 2ESTATEMENT 4HIRD
of Torts, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 2–3 (2008).
44

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: DUTY § 7 (2005):
(a) An actor ordinarily has a duty to exercise reasonable care when the actor’s
conduct creates a risk of physical harm. (b) In exceptional cases, when an
articulated countervailing principle or policy warrants denying or limiting liability
in a particular class of cases, a court may decide that the defendant has no duty or
that the ordinary duty of reasonable care requires modiﬁcation.

45

)D

46

See, e.g., Twerski, supra note 43, at 2–3; W. Johnathan Cardi, 0URGING &ORESEABILITY 4HE .EW
6ISION OF $UTY AND *UDICIAL 0OWER IN THE 0ROPOSED 2ESTATEMENT 4HIRD OF 4ORTS, 58 VAND. L. REV. 739
passim (2005); Dilan A. Esper & Gregory C. Keating, !BUSING h$UTY v 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 265 passim
(2006); David Owen, $UTY 2ULES, 54 VAND. L. REV. 767 passim (2001). See generally Jane Stapleton,
%VALUATING 'OLDBERG AND :IPURSKYS #IVIL 2ECOURSE 4HEORY, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1529 passim (2006);
Ernest J. Weinrub, 4HE 0ASSING OF 0ALSGRAF, 54 VAND. L. REV. 803 passim (2001).
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greater confusion among courts and practitioners.47 Indeed, this misunderstanding
of the role of duty has led courts to skip to examining afﬁrmative defenses without
ever analyzing the prima facie element of duty.48 The court must recognize that
between these two extremes lies substantial room to analyze the element of duty.49

4HE 2ESTATEMENT 4HIRD OF 4ORTS 4HE %ND OF $UTY
The Restatement (Third) of Torts eliminates duty from the negligence
equation.50 Instead, everyone has a duty to act reasonably when a possibility of
injury exits.51 This generalized duty replaces the traditional four-element test for
negligence.52 As described in the Third Restatement, duty is not an element of a
prima facie negligence case.53 Under this negligence regime, an injured plaintiff
need only show that the defendant failed to act reasonably to avoid causing harm
to another.54 Additionally, courts may relieve defendants of liability for otherwise
negligent conduct because of policy reasons.55 The removal of duty as an element of
negligence represents the result of long-simmering criticism among tort scholars.56
Many scholars denigrate duty as “wholly unnecessary or hopelessly confused.”57
Some commentators have thrown up their hands, claiming duty deﬁes deﬁnition
because of its changing nature.58 The drafters of the Third Restatement intended
to resolve this confusion and frustration by proclaiming a generalized duty applies
to all, making duty a background principle rather than an element.59

47

Rabin, supra note 38, at 790–91. It must be recognized that this sort of analytical confusion
cannot remain a matter of indifference. )D at 791.
48
See id. at 791. For example, courts routinely state baseball game attendees assume the risk
when attending a game without examining whether the ballpark even owed the attendee a duty. )D
49

See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 31, at 730.

50

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: DUTY § 7(a) (2005).

51

)D

52
See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEATON ON TORTS § 30 (1984); Stroup v.
Oedekoven, 995 P.2d 125, 130 (Wyo. 1999). The elements of negligence remain duty, breach,
proximate cause, and damage. )D
53

Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 31, at 659–60.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: GENERAL PRINCIPLES § 101 (2005) (“An actor has a legal
obligation, in the conduct of the actor’s own affairs, to act reasonably to avoid causing legally
cognizable harm to another.”).
54

55

)D § 105. This approach represents a drastic difference from the model of ﬁnding no duty.
See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 31, at 659–60. Instead, the court presumes duty and only
relieves the defendant of liability because of an overarching policy reason. See id.
56

See Twerski, supra note 43, at 2–3.

John C.P. Goldberg, $UTY  THE 3TRUCTURE OF .EGLIGENCE, 10 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 149,
150 (2000).
57

58
Peter F. Lake, #OMMON ,AW h$UTYv !NALYSIS 4HE #ONCEPTUAL %XPANSION OF h$UTYv IN A 0ERIOD
OF $OCTRINAL #ONSOLIDATION2ETRENCHMENT, 10 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 153, 154 (2000).
59

See Esper & Keating, supra note 46, at 266–67.
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The problem with this approach lies in the fact that it radically upsets
recognized standards of tort law.60 For example, in "ENTON V #ITY OF /AKLAND,
plaintiff would only need to establish the defendant failed to use reasonable care
while maintaining a public swimming pool and this failure caused plaintiff ’s
paralysis.61 Similarly, in -C'LOTHIN V !NCHORAGE, by unreasonably failing to
inform plaintiff that the scoreboard he was about to lift was extremely heavy,
defendant committed negligence resulting in plaintiff ’s back injuries.62 These
examples demonstrate the signiﬁcant difference between the Third Restatement
and the traditional four-element negligence test.63 The Third Restatement’s shift
to a generalized duty represents a substantial change in the law of negligence.64 As
such, it has engendered a considerable amount of controversy.65

4HE "ACKLASH !RGUING FOR THE 4RADITIONAL 2OLE OF $UTY
The major criticism rests in the fact that almost every state court handles
negligence cases according to the traditional four-element test, which requires
the plaintiff to satisfy the duty element.66 Additionally, commentators argue the
Third Restatement suffers from serious defects as a restatement of negligence
law.67 Speciﬁcally, duty often remains at issue in “straightforward cases involving
‘accidental personal injury or physical damage.’”68

60

See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 31, at 665–66. “[The Third Restatement] is a
substantial departure in the expression of the structure of negligence from that of the courts.” )D at
665. “Most notably, there is no duty requirement in this provision, even though there is according
to the usual formulation.” )D
61
)D. at 666 (citing Benton v. City of Oakland, 721 N.E.2d 224, 233 (Ind. 1999)). In
"ENTON, the court held that in the face of confusing precedent, the city did owe the plaintiff a duty.
"ENTON, 721 N.E.2d at 224. However, the court carefully analyzed whether a duty existed, rather
than relying on the concept of general reasonable care, as advocated by the Third Restatement. )D.
at 233.
62
Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 31, at 666 (citing McGlothin v. Anchorage, 991 P.2d
1273 (Alaska 1999)) (holding where plaintiff injured his back while lifting a sign owned by
defendant, he owed no duty to plaintiff to warn him of the associated risks of lifting the sign).
63

See id.

64

)D at 665–66.

65

See Twerski, supra note 43, at 2–3.

66

See Albert v. Hsu, 602 So. 2d 895, 897 (Ala. 1992) (quoting Rose v. Miller & Co., Inc.,
432 So. 2d 1237, 1238 (Ala. 1983)) (“Where there is no duty, there can be no negligence.”);
Lauer v. City of New York, 733 N.E.2d 184, 187 (N.Y. 2000) (citing Pulka v. Edelman, 358
N.E.2d 1019 (N.Y. 1976)) (“Without a duty running directly to the injured person there can be
no liability in damages, however careless the conduct or foreseeable the harm.”); Duncan v. Afton,
Inc., 991 P.2d 739, 742 (Wyo. 1999) (quoting Goodrich v. Seamands, 870 P.2d 1061, 1064 (Wyo.
1994)) (“Essential to any negligence cause of action is proof of facts which impose a duty upon
defendant.”).
67

See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 31, at 678.

68

)D
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Even in “easy” physical injury cases, the duty element remains a point of
contention which the courts must decide.69 The case of -USSIVAND V $AVID
illustrates this point.70 Plaintiff acquired a sexually transmitted disease from his
wife.71 Plaintiff ’s wife contracted the disease from defendant, her secret lover.72
When plaintiff sued defendant for negligence, defendant claimed the duty element
remained unsatisﬁed.73 However, the Ohio Supreme Court rejected defendant’s
argument, partly on the basis that he could have reasonably foreseen his lack of
precautions put plaintiff at risk.74 Thus, defendant owed a duty to plaintiff to not
transmit the disease to him, at least until plaintiff ’s wife became aware of her own
infection.75 This case demonstrates a court need not ﬁnd a generalized duty to
provide relief to plaintiffs.76 An analysis of duty, such as that found in -USSIVAND,
remains the standard almost all courts use in negligence cases.77 Critics argue the
Third Restatement must lay bare the elements of negligence as deﬁned by the
courts, not impose a contrary deﬁnition.78 Thus, the Third Restatement serves
only to confuse courts and practitioners about the developing role of duty and its
current place in a negligence analysis.79

7YOMINGS -EASURE OF $UTYnGates’s Factor Test
Wyoming provides a test for determining and outlining duty that balances
a generalized duty while respecting the traditional four-element test.80 The
Wyoming Supreme Court ﬁrst introduced this test in 'ATES V 2ICHARDSON.81
For twenty-two years, the Wyoming Supreme Court used the 'ATES test to
(1) determine if a duty existed and (2) provide rationalization for a ﬁnding of
duty.82 This test provides a middle road in duty analysis, designed to provide

69

)D at 678–79.

70

Mussivand v. David, 544 N.E.2d 265, 266–67 (Ohio 1989).

71

)D at 266–67.

72

)D at 267.

73

)D at 272.

74

)D at 270.

75

-USSIVAND, 544 N.E.2d at 272–73.

76

See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 31, at 678–79.

77

See id. at 676-77; Esper & Keating, supra note 46, at 268.

78

Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 31, at 676.

79

See generally id. at 677.

80

3EE 'ATES, 719 P.2d at 196.

81

)D (holding that Wyoming recognizes the tort of negligent inﬂiction of emotional distress,
and providing an eight-factor test to determine duty).
82

See, e.g., Mostert v. CBL & Associates, 741 P.2d 1090, 1093 (Wyo. 1987); R.D. v. W.H.,
875 P.2d 26, 31 (Wyo. 1994); Natrona County v. Blake, 81 P.3d 948, 951 (Wyo. 2003); Black v.
William Insulation Co., Inc., 141 P.3d 123, 127 (Wyo. 2006).
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courts and practitioners with both an answer to a question of duty and a rationale
for that answer.83 Indeed, both practitioners and Wyoming courts use the 'ATES
factor-test extensively to ﬁnd duty in negligence cases.84 Speciﬁcally, Glenn used
the 'ATES factor-test to argue for a ﬁnding of duty in his brief.85 However, the
'LENN court ignored this test in its analysis.86
Factor tests try to balance fairness, public policy concerns and justice while
providing ﬂexibility for courts.87 In Wyoming, the courts balance these sometimes
conﬂicting goals by applying the following eight factors to the facts presented:
(1) the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff; (2) the closeness of the connection
between the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered; (3) the degree of
certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury; (4) the moral blame attached to the
defendant’s conduct; (5) the policy of preventing future harm; (6) the extent of
the burden upon the defendant; (7) the consequences to the community and
the court system; and (8) the availability, cost and prevalence of insurance for
the risk involved.88 The 'ATES factor test continues to serve as a valuable tool
for the Wyoming Supreme Court and practitioners when questions of duty arise
in new and difﬁcult situations.89 However, the court has become increasingly
inconsistent in its approach to the 'ATES factor test by ignoring it in some cases
or merely glossing over it in others.90 This inconsistency may soon lead to more
confusion among practitioners regarding duty as it now appears unclear when the
Wyoming Supreme Court would use the 'ATES factor test to determine if a duty
exists.91

PRINCIPAL CASE
The Wyoming Supreme Court held in a unanimous opinion that Union
Paciﬁc owed Glenn a duty to provide rail cars reasonably safe for their intended

83

3EE 'ATES, 719 P.2d at 196.

84

See, e.g., Brief of Appellant, supra note 5, at 31; Ortega v. Flaim, 902 P.2d 199, 203, 206
(Wyo. 1995).
85

Brief of Appellant, supra note 5, at 33–43.

86

See 'LENN, 176 P.3d at 642–43.

87

See David G. Owen, 4HE &IVE %LEMENTS OF .EGLIGENCE, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1671, 1676

(2007).
88

'ATES, 719 P.2d at 196 (citing Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal.

1976)).
89
See, e.g., Killian v. Caza Drilling, Inc., 131 P.3d 975, 980 (Wyo. 2006); Erpelding v. Lisek,
71 P.3d 754, 758 (Wyo. 2003); Larsen v. Banner Health Sys., 81 P.3d 196, 199 (Wyo. 2003).
90
See Nulle v. Gillette–Campbell County Joint Powers Fire Bd., 797 P.2d 1171, 1173 (Wyo.
1990) (distinguishing from 'ATES and refusing to apply the 'ATES factors test); Hendricks v. Hurley,
184 P.3d 680, 686 (Wyo. 2008) (applying only the foreseeability aspect of the 'ATES factors test).
91
3EE (ENDRICKS, 184 P.3d at 686. In a fact pattern similar to 'ATES, the court did not apply
the 'ATES factor test and only remarked on the foreseeability of injury as a basis for duty. )D
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use.92 First the 'LENN court, largely reasoning by analogy, discussed a generalized
duty of reasonable care.93 Then, again reasoning by analogy, the court switched to
a discussion of specialized duty, including premises liability and carrier liability,
before arriving at an ad hoc determination of duty.94

'ENERAL $UTY AND 3PECIlC $UTIES
4RYING TO &IND THE "ASIS FOR 5NION 0ACIlCS $UTY
The 'LENN court used reasoning by analogy to address Union Paciﬁc’s
long-recognized duty to exercise ordinary and reasonable care and prudence in
operating its railway.95 Here, the court likened the railroad’s obligation to clear its
right-of-way to a generalized duty to operate in a reasonable manner.96 It went on
to state that if the railroad violates this generalized duty and an injury results, then
liability could ensue.97 The court then likened an injury resulting from a violation
of this generalized duty to when a door from a rail car falls and hurts a railroad
employee while he unloads cargo.98
The court next discussed #HICAGO "  1 22 V -URRAY, noting that a
railroad’s duty seems similar to that of a premises owner to an invitee.99 The
opinion analogizes Union Paciﬁc’s new-found duty regarding its rail cars to that
of a premises owner who must keep her premises reasonably safe for the invitee’s
protection.100 In a footnote to this discussion, the court notes that #HICAGO 
.7 22 V /TT and -URRAY involve a railroad’s liability to its own employees and
no other, though it uses these cases to analogize a duty to a third party; in this
case, Glenn.101

92

'LENN, 176 P.3d at 643.

93

)D at 642–43.

94

)D at 643.

95

)D at 642–43.

96

)D at 642.

97

'LENN, 176 P.3d at 642.

98

)D at 643 (citing Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. Ott, 237 P. 238, 239 (Wyo. 1925)).

99

)D (citing Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Murray, 277 P. 703, 707 (Wyo. 1929)).

100

)D

101

)D at 643 n.3 (citing Ott, 237 P. at 238); -URRAY, 277 P. at 707. The court also mentions
Glenn’s reliance upon a First Circuit case that also involved a railroad’s liability to its own employees.
'LENN, 176 P.3d at 643 n.3. The court then acknowledged Union Paciﬁc’s assertion that Boston
& Maine R.R. Co. v. Sullivan, 275 F. 890 (1st Cir. 1928) and similar cases remain inapplicable
because the Federal Employers Liability Act (“FELA”) governs the railroads’ liability to its own
employees. )D. It did note that the principles of negligence form the foundation of FELA. )D. It also
mentioned other states’ cases holding railroads owe the same duty to its own employees as it does to
non-employees authorized to load, unload, or work on its rail cars. )D.
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The court next addressed Union Paciﬁc’s duty to perform a reasonable
inspection of its rail cars.102 This duty entails either remedying or warning
customers about dangerous conditions.103 The opinion goes on to agree with the
district court’s ﬁnding that Union Paciﬁc’s customer was Black Butte, and Black
Butte’s duty to Glenn as his employer included providing a safe place to work.104
It then disagreed with the district court on the issue of whether a customer’s duty
to provide a reasonably safe workplace supplants the railroad’s duty to provide
reasonably safe rail cars.105 The court determined the railroad’s duty remained,
and supported its ﬁnding with #HICAGO 2)  02 #O V 7ILLIAMS, which held
an employer’s duty to provide a reasonably safe workplace could not supplant a
carrier’s duty.106 Ultimately, the court concluded Union Paciﬁc owed Glenn a duty
to provide rail cars reasonably safe for their intended use.107

ANALYSIS
This analysis section begins by exploring the court’s own confusion about the
place of duty, as evidenced in the 'LENN opinion’s shift between generalized duty
and very specialized duty, like premises liability and carrier liability.108 Next, it
discusses the court’s decision as part of a greater confusion regarding duty present
among courts, practitioners, and the American Law Institute (“ALI”).109 Finally,
this analysis argues that the only remedy for this continuing confusion resides in
the Wyoming Supreme Court reafﬁrming the 'ATES factor test as the analysis for
ﬁnding a new duty.110

The Glenn $ECISION $EMONSTRATES THE 7YOMING 3UPREME #OURTS
#ONFUSION 2EGARDING $UTY
The 'LENN court ignored the importance of grounding its decision on logic
and past precedents.111 To support its holding, the court riﬂes through various

102

'LENN, 176 P.3d at 643.

103

)D

104

)D

105

)D

106

)D (citing Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co. v. Williams, 245 F.2d 397, 402 (8th Cir. 1957)).

107

'LENN, 176 P.3d at 643.

108

See infra notes 115–29 and accompanying text (discussing the 'LENN court’s disregard of
past precedents and the relevance of such action to Wyoming practitioners).
109
See infra notes 130–57 and accompanying text (discussing confusion regarding duty among
many elements of the legal community and placing the 'LENN court’s decision within that general
confusion).
110
See infra notes 158–72 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of reafﬁrming
the 'ATES test as Wyoming’s measure of duty).
111

See Rabin, supra note 38, at 790–91.
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interpretations of duty, including a generalized duty and specialized duties.112
However, the court’s ultimate holding remains an ad hoc decision, lacking
clariﬁcation because it discusses generalized and specialized duties while applying
neither.113 The court’s ruling clearly ignores the importance of providing rationale
for this new duty.114

Why the Glenn #OURTS #ONFUSION IS 2ELEVANT TO 7YOMING 0RACTITIONERS
The 'LENN court’s confusion regarding duty may seem like an unimportant
matter.115 However, the Wyoming Supreme Court’s confusion regarding duty
in 'LENN becomes problematic because it creates the potential for incorrectly
understood precedents, leading to error in future cases.116 This kind of confusion
strikes at the very foundations of negligence law.117 Negligence law gauges
decisions to engage in harmful behavior as proper or improper.118 Behavior
becomes improper only if it breaches a preexisting obligation to refrain from
harm carelessly inﬂicted on others.119 Thus, duty provides reason to a negligence
inquiry.120 As the foundational element of a negligence claim, duty acts as a portal
through which every negligence claim must pass.121
This “duty portal” sets the boundary of the scope of recovery for negligentlyinﬂicted harm.122 Even more importantly, how strongly a court frames duty
rules controls which negligence suits pass to full adjudication or suffer summary
judgment.123 When courts rely on categories of generalized duty, more suits
which lack foundation in negligence law make their way into local courtrooms.124
Conversely, when courts rely on categories of specialized duty, such as traditional

112

3EE 'LENN, 176 P.3d at 642–43.

113

See id. at 643.

114

See, id.; see also Rabin, supra note 38, at 791. When courts fail to provide rationalization for
their ﬁndings of duty, practitioners cannot effectively support future arguments. )D
115
Owen, supra note 91, at 1673 (“Normally, most courts and commentators have other
(arguably more important) ﬁsh to fry and little interest in triﬂing with how one element or another
should be conceived or phrased.”).
116
See Honorable Theodore R. Boehm, A Tangled Webb2EEXAMINING THE 2OLE OF $UTY IN
)NDIANA .EGLIGENCE !CTIONS, 37 IND. L. REV. 1, 14–15 (2003).
117

)D at 15.

118

Owen, supra note 91, at 1675.

119

)D

120

See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 31, at 672.

121

Owen, supra note 91, at 1675.

122

See Twerski, supra note 43, at 21–22.

Owen, supra note 91, at 1675; see Joseph W. Little, 0ALSGRAF 2EVISITED !GAIN , 6 PIERCE L.
REV. 75, 106–07 (2007).
123

124

Owen, supra note 91, at 1675.
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premises liability, injured plaintiffs are forced to fend for themselves or seek relief
from insurance providers and other entities outside the courts.125

4HE #OURTS $ECISION IS #LEAR %VIDENCE OF A 'REATER #ONFUSION
2EGARDING $UTY
The 'LENN court’s confusion regarding duty reﬂects the turmoil in tort law
surrounding the concept of duty present among practitioners, courts, and the
ALI.126 Disputes regarding the elements of negligence, particularly duty, arise
every time the ALI issues its Restatement on the Law of Torts.127 The importance
of one element of a claim may not appear self-evident.128 However, the outline
of torts, including the place of duty, structures how lawyers frame speciﬁc
issues.129 In turn, lawyers’ analyses of duty affect how judges apply this element
to cases.130 Thus, the formulation of negligence’s elements remains important to
a fundamental understanding of the essence of negligence and how to properly
apply it.131
The 'LENN court’s discussion of generalized duty reﬂects one side of this
controversy.132 While the 'LENN court did not openly adopt a generalized duty in
'LENN, the court must recognize what confusion such a declaration would cause for
practitioners and the court alike.133 The draft Restatement (Third) of Torts, which
eliminates duty as an element for ordinary negligence claims, and the controversy
surrounding this change, demonstrates a general uncertainty regarding the role
of duty.134 By eliminating duty as an element for an ordinary negligence claim,
the Third Restatement relegates duty to a background principle.135 Alternatively,
some commentators ﬁnd the prospect of rewriting duty an invitation for chaos.136

125

See id.

126

W. Johnathan Cardi & Michael D. Green, $UTY 7ARS, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 671, 673–82

(2008).
127

See Little, supra note 127, at 82–83.

128

See Owen, supra note 91, at 1672–73.

129

)D

130

See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 31, at 661–62 (discussing the impact of such
arguments on the California Supreme Court).
131

Owen, supra note 91, at 1673.

132

3EE 'LENN, 176 P.3d at 643. The 'LENN court mirrors the language of the Third Restatement
by stating railroads have a duty to act reasonably. )D
133

Little, supra note 127, at 96–100.

134

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: DUTY § 7 (2005).

135

Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 31, at 658–64.

136

See id.
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Unfortunately, some states have accepted the invitation to eliminate duty as an
element of a negligence claim, resulting in inconsistent verdicts.137
The Wyoming Supreme Court need only look to the Wisconsin courts to see
the absurd outcomes resulting from such a generalized duty.138 Sincere hope that
plaintiffs recover more often under a general duty regime fade into the mist upon
examination of an illustrative case: 3MAXWELL V "AYARD.139 The defendant owned
two adjoining parcels of land, L1 and L2.140 L1 contained several residential
buildings, occupied by the defendant’s tenants, T1 and T2.141 L2 remained
vacant.142 In this case, the defendant allowed T1 to build a dog kennel on L2 to
house wolf-dog hybrids.143 Surrounding inhabitants complained about this use of
L2, noting a wolf-hybrid had recently bitten a deputy sheriff.144 The defendant
knew of this incident.145 As feared, one of the hybrids escaped, came upon L1,
and attacked T2.146 T2 then sued the defendant.147 The lower courts granted the
defendant’s motion for summary judgment on public policy grounds.148 The
Wisconsin Supreme Court afﬁrmed this ﬁnding, citing fear of opening a ﬂoodgate
of litigation against landlords and landowners for dog attacks when they do not
own the offending dog.149
The frustration attending this decision rests in the recognition that many, if
not most, courts would have held the defendant owed the foreseeable plaintiffs a
duty of care to restrain the animals.150 The Wyoming Supreme Court must not
embrace the generalized duty advocated by the Third Restatement and Wisconsin
because of the confusion and absurd verdicts it engenders.151 Instead, it must

137

Little, supra note 127, at 98–106. Wisconsin remains the only state to adopt ofﬁcially a
generalized duty to all to act reasonably. )D However, California may soon follow suit. Cardi &
Green, supra note 46, at 726–32.
138

See Little, supra note 127, at 96–107.

139

Smaxwell v. Bayard, 682 N.W.2d 923, 925 (Wis. 2004).

140

)D at 925–26.

141

)D

142

)D at 927–28.

143

)D

144

Smaxwell, 682 N.W. at 927.

145

)D at 927.

146

)D at 928.

147

)D

148

)D

149

Smaxwell, 628 N.W. at 928.

150

Little, supra note 127, at 105–06.

151

See Owen, supra note 91, at 1673-75; see generally Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 31, at

661–75.
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return to its own precedent.152 The Wyoming Supreme Court can avoid all this
bewilderment by using the 'ATES eight-factor test, which established the correct
precedent for determining duty.153

4HE 7YOMING 3UPREME #OURT -UST 2EAFlRM THE Gates %IGHT &ACTOR 4EST FOR
&INDING $UTY
The Wyoming Supreme Court mistakenly ignored the 'ATES factor test in
its discussion of duty.154 By not using the 'ATES test to provide rationale for its
ﬁnding, the court confuses practitioners.155 The Wyoming Supreme Court must
recognize that when analyzing a new duty, it must not think categorically by
restricting itself to either a generalized duty or specialized duty.156 Instead, it
must weigh the facts presented with the 'ATES factor test to provide a rationalized
holding.157 As the element of duty draws upon such concepts as fairness, justice,
and social policy, the 'ATES factor test provides a means for the court to balance
conﬂicting values and policies while avoiding the pitfalls of categorizing duty too
openly or restrictively.158
Other states found the solution to problematic questions of duty by applying
factor tests to the speciﬁc facts of various cases.159 Indiana stands out as a potent
example of a state adopting a factor test to determine duty in all situations.160
Indiana courts routinely found, or did not ﬁnd, duty in a haphazard manner,
lacking any thought given to factual contexts, such as relationships or other tort
obligations.161 To combat this confusion, the Indiana Supreme Court adopted a
factor test as a formula to identify duty in Webb v. Jarvis.162 The Indiana Supreme
Court announced a three-part test to identify duty: (1) the relationship between
the parties, (2) the foreseeability of harm, and (3) public policy concerns.163
152

'ATES, 719 P.2d at 196.

153

See id.

154

3EE 'LENN, 176 P.3d at 642–43.

155

See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 31, at 657. Duty lacking foundation remains useless
to the practitioner and courts. )D.
156

Twerski, supra note 43, at 21–22.

157

See Boehm, supra note 120, at 5.

158

See Owen, supra note 91, at 1676.

159

See Boehm, supra note 120, at 5.

160

See id.

161

See Jay Tidmarsh, 4ORT ,AW 4HE ,ANGUAGES OF $UTY, 25 IND. L. REV. 1419, 1425 (1992).

162

Webb v. Jarvis, 575 N.E.2d 992, 995 (Ind. 1991). Webb involved a patient who shot his
brother-in-law in a ﬁt of rage caused by an over-prescription of steroids. )D at 994. The brotherin-law sued the prescribing doctor, claiming the doctor breached his duty to administer medical
treatment so as to account for possible harm to others. )D at 995. Holding the doctor owed no duty,
the Indiana Supreme Court adopted a three factor test to determine duty. )D
163

)D

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol9/iss2/11

14

Luck-Torry: Tort Law - Duty a Little Unthought Of: The Wyoming Supreme Court'

CASE NOTE

2009

675

Indiana has inconsistently applied the Webb test, leading to confusion about
whether the test supersedes existing formulations of duty, complements them,
or applies only when new duty arises.164 Additionally, some Indiana courts have
ignored the Webb test, or misapplied it.165 The solution cannot rest in copying
Indiana’s approach of adopting policy considerations in lieu of an actual inquiry
into duty.166 Instead, the Wyoming Supreme Court must clarify when and how
the 'ATES factor test applies, rather than ignoring it or overly simplifying the
factors.167 To do otherwise confuses practitioners and lower courts, and has the
potential to create ill-considered legal precedent.168

CONCLUSION
'LENN reafﬁrms the foundations of basic tort law: provide compensation in
order to make the plaintiff “whole” again.169 However, to provide the plaintiff
relief in this situation, the court needed to ﬁnd Union Paciﬁc owed Glenn a
duty.170 Though the court ultimately reached this conclusion, it fails to explain its
holding.171
The new duty invoked by the court does not seem useful to future claims
because of the confusion engendered by its lack of rationalization.172 The 'LENN
court should have used the 'ATES factor test to better serve lower courts and

164

See Boehm, supra note 120, at 5 (discussing Indiana’s application of factor tests).

165

)D

166

)D at 18.

167

3EE 'LENN, 176 P.3d at 643–45 (analyzing duty regarding Union Paciﬁc and Glenn). Glenn
used the 'ATES test in the Brief of Appellant, including going through a step-by-step analysis applying
the factors and determining a duty existed. Brief of Appellant, supra note 5, at 10. The court ignored
the 'ATES factors in its 'LENN opinion. 3EE 'LENN, 176 P.3d at 643–45. See also (ENDRICKS, 184 P.3d
at 686. In (ENDRICKS, an eight-year-old boy died from electrocution after touching an ungrounded
well-head at his grandparents’ house. )D at 681. Hendricks, the boy’s mother, sued the grandparents,
the Hurleys, to recover for emotional injuries from their failure to use reasonable care to inspect
the well and in supervising the child. )D The Wyoming Supreme Court afﬁrmed the district court’s
summary judgment in favor of the Hurleys. )D In coming to its conclusion, the court only mentions
'ATES when discussing proximate cause. )D at 686. The absence of the 'ATES factor test in this
context seems particularly shocking because the test arose to address claims for emotional injuries.
)D; 'ATES 719 P.2d at 196–98.
168

See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 31, at 658.

169

Esper & Keating, supra note 46, at 273.

170

See supra note 84 and accompanying text.

171

See supra notes 85–109 and accompanying text.

172

See 'LENN, 176 P.3d at 642–43.
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practitioners because it would have articulated a rationale for its ﬁnding.173
Instead, the court delivers a new duty without supporting rationale.174
An opinion lacking necessary rationale concerning an essential element lacks
true usefulness for practitioners and lower courts.175 Though the court correctly
overturned the district court’s ﬁnding of no duty, only once this new duty is
explained and rationalized can it truly become a part of Wyoming case law to
serve as a tool for injured plaintiffs.176

173
See supra notes 159–73 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of the 'ATES
factor test in supporting ﬁndings of duty).
174

See supra notes 100–12 and accompanying text (discussing the court’s ﬁnding of duty).

175

See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 31, at 657.

176

Brief of Appellant, supra note 5, at 6–7; SEE ALSO 'LENN, 176 P.3d at 643.
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